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Title: Shareholder Wars at Banco Português de Investimento 
 
This case study aims to describe the impacts created on Banco Português de 
Investimento’s governance when supervision of the largest 120 European banks 
switched from National Banks to the European Central Bank. When this 
occurred, BPI was informed that its exposure to Angola, through one of its 
subsidiaries- Banco de Fomento Angolano-, surpassed the limit of the large risks 
imposed by the ECB in €3 billion. The urge for solutions to avoid daily sanctions 
by the ECB triggered a fight for control between the bank’s key shareholders, La 
Caixa and Santoro Finance, given that Isabel dos Santos, daughter of Angola’s 
president, was a key shareholder both in BPI and in Banco de Fomento Angolano- 
through a company named Unitel. The Governance of the Bank comprising a 
shareholders voting rights limit, the number of Shareholder’s evolution, the 
negotiation process that included a Portuguese Government intervention, the sale 
of part of BFA to Unitel and the tender offer launched by La Caixa in order to 
control BPI are discussed in detail to provide the reader all the information 
required to assess on whether or not all good Governance principles were 
followed throughout the process. 
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Shareholder Wars at Banco Português de Investimento  
 
“The heedlessly application of a rule, which I do not discuss, will oblige us to be expelled from 
Angola. Until today I have not yet heard any words from anyone with responsibility in Portugal 
that worried with this. [...] From the former Government, zero, nor even from the ex-Prime-
Minister nor from the ex-Finance Minister. [...] My discontent is not with the European 
institutions.” 
Fernando Ulrich, CEO, BPI1 
 
In December 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced that the Republic of Angola 
had not been included in the list of 17 States or territories in which financial institution 
supervision could be recognised as equivalent to the one conducted by the European Union. 
Under these rules, European banks can not be exposed to sovereign debt of these countries in 
more than 25% of their equity value. 
These were shocking news for Banco Português de Investimentos (BPI), a Portuguese bank 
whose Angolan subsidiary, Banco de Fomento Angolano (BFA), would make it surpass this 
limit in €3 billion. If a solution for such exposures could not be reached by April of 2016, BPI 
would have to pay €3.5 million in daily fines2. 
This could not have happened at a worst moment. The bank was facing significant challenges 
at its home country market, who had recently been bailed out by a troyka of financial backers 
(ECB, International Monetary Fund and European Union) while facing a war amongst its main 
shareholders. Two months after ECB’s decision, BPI’s key shareholder La Caixa decided to 
launch a tender offer in order to acquire all outstanding shares3.  
One of the other key shareholders, Santoro Finance (holding 18.8% of BPI) opposed La Caixa’s 
bid (see Exhibit 1). The firm was controlled by Isabel dos Santos, daughter of Angola’s 
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President, who also controlled Unitel- owner of 49.9% of BFA4. She had interests on both sides 
of the problem and the existing voting rights limit gave her about the same controlling power 
as the one La Caixa had in BPI. Now, the bank needed to find a fast solution to avoid any 
sanctions from ECB and, at the same time, allow for all key shareholders to protect their 
interests.  
At a time when a required €12 billion equity issuea that accommodated this exposure in capital 
buffer was impossible, would Isabel dos Santos concede her power in Portugal in exchange for 




In October 1981, Sociedade Portuguesa de Investimentos (SPI) was created under the initiative 
of Artur Santos Silva. With the aim of providing finance to private investment projects, 
contribute to the re-launching of capital markets in Portugal and to the modernization of 
Portuguese enterprise structures, SPI had a diversified shareholder base, composed by over 100 
shareholders, mainly Northern Portuguese business leaders. 
Santos Silva was nominated in 1968 as general director of Banco Português do Atlântico, a 
position he left in 1975 when he was appointed as State Secretary of the Portuguese Treasury. 
After leaving the Government, he became Vice-Governor of the Bank of Portugal from 1977 
to 1978. 
In 1985, SPI became an investment bank, capable of accepting deposits and granting loans. 
The investment bank was given the name Banco Português de Investimento (BPI). One year 
later, in the same year that Portugal joined the European Economic Community, SPI went 
through an IPOb, and was quoted on the Portuguese stock market5,6.  
 
The rise of a Financial Institution 
In August 1991, BPI, backed by Itaú Bank, won the privatization process of the commercial 
bank Banco Fonsecas e Burnay. In 1995, BPI went through a reorganization process which 
created a banking holdings society, named BPI SGPS, which substituted SPI in the Portuguese 
                                                
a Given that the Risk Weighted Assets weighting for this exposure started to be computed at 
100% instead of 0% or 20% (as sovereign debt is), the €12 billion equity raise would allow 
BPI to maintain the more than €3 billion exposure to Angola, since it would be lower than 
25% of its equity book value. 
b Initial Public Offering 
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stock market. This was the moment in which La Caja de Ahorros y Pensiones de Barcelona 
(La Caixa) along with the German Insurer Allianz became shareholders in the bank.  
In 1996, BPI won the privatization process Banco de Fomento Exterior (BFE). BFE was one 
of the first ever created Portuguese Investment Banks. Established by the Portuguese 
Government in 1959, it had acquired Banco Borges & Irmão in 1991, however working as two 
separate entities. Winning the privatization process helped BPI to court the remaining 35% of 
BFE’s shares, held by minority shareholders.  
The year of 1998 was the year of the conclusion of all merger processes. The result was the 
disappearance of the 3 banks’ brands belonging to BPI’s group and the consequent rebranding 
of all branches under just one name: Banco BPI. BPI Group now had two major activities under 





Since the creation of SPI, BPI always had a strong Investment Banking activity component. In 
1991, a decade after the creation of SPI, BPI was already market leader in Investment Banking 
in Portugal. In 2000, this bank’s division had a strong focus on Corporate Finance and other 
areas including Project Finance, Brokerage, Research, Debt Capital Markets, Private Banking, 
Asset Management, Investment Funds, Pension Schemes, Venture Capital and Private Equity8. 
In the same year, BPI- Investimentos registered net profits of €28 million euros (18% of the 
group’s overall results). In 2006 and 2007, the division improved its performance, with an 
average of €24.8 million of net profit. However, in 2008 due to the recession, Iberian capital 
markets suffered a 47% decrease in trading volumes which hit BPI- Investimentos (that year’s 
net profit was €10.4 million). Still, between 2007 and 2009, it had 24.5% of Portuguese 
Corporate Finance market share9. 
 
Commercial Banking 
In 1999, after all acquisitions were completed, BPI’s Commercial Banking unit was split into 
Individuals Banking, Corporate Banking, Institutional Banking (for Municipal and Institutional 
clients) and in Other Activities that included Leasing and Factoring businesses. In 2005, BPI’s 
group had €22.2 billion in total customer resources, €21 billion in its loan portfolio, a return 
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on shareholder’s equity of 23.5% (21.8% in 2000) and a return on average total assets of 0.9% 
(0.8% in 2000)10. 
2008 was the first year that BPI saw the impact of financial crisis, with net profits falling 
57.7%. BPI’s portfolio differed from its peers, as its exposure to real estate and consumer credit 
were lower than most Portuguese Banks (see Exhibit 12 to 21). Instead, the search for high 
yield investments resulted in a high exposure to sovereign debt, mostly Greek and Portuguese. 
BPI was then obliged by the European Banking Authority to issue €1,5 billion in Contingent 
Convertible bonds (CoCos), booked by the Portuguese Government (with money from the 
troika intervention), to provide capital buffers11,12.  
The major difference between a CoCo and a regular Convertible Debt13 security lays on their 
contingent convertible feature. In the case of Convertible Debt, the holder converts in the 
upside- when the equity value is superior than the debt repayment. In the case of BPI’s CoCos, 
the Portuguese Government would automatically convert them into common equity in the 
downside- from the moment when BPI’s Common Equity Tier 1 ratio fell below 7%. These 
were fully repaid until 2014 with no need for conversion (see Exhibit 22). 
 
Africa: the sweet escape 
Angola 
In 1990, BFE opened a representation office in Luanda, the capital of Angola. Three years 
later, aiming to reinforce its representation on the country, BFE opened an own branch in 
Luanda with a starting capital equivalent to $4 million. This was the starting point for the 
beginning of the bank’s activity in the country. When BPI bought BFE in 1996, a strong 
expansion plan was laid out. The aim was to expand its activity in a country with several 
business and development opportunities14.  
In 2002, BPI decided that its representation in Angola could be improved. Transforming all the 
Angolan branches it had at the time, the result was a newly created entity: Banco de Fomento 
Angolano (BFA). Owned 100% by BPI and having a market share of 25% in 2002, the mission 
of BFA was to support Angolan businesses in their regular activities and to be the the financing 
partner when such firms decided to expand their activities internationally.  
BFA delivered sound results since its inception to BPI. Growing from 230,000 clients in 2005 
to 553,000 clients in 200811, its profits increased from €69.7 million (2005) to €140.6 million. 
Also in 2008 BPI sold 49.9% of BFA to Unitel, an Angolan telecommunications firm, in which 
Isabel dos Santos is a key controlling shareholder. One of the reasons disclosed was to prompt 
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BFA growth with the help of a strategic shareholder of the market in which it operated. On the 
other hand, there were also pressures from the Angolan Government that wanted local banks 
to have connections with local companies. Unitel paid $200 million right away and $275 
million in eight annual installments, from 2009 to 2016. Afterwards, BFA was very important 
to offset some of the losses suffered by BPI during the financial crisis. The best example 
occurred in 201315, when BFA contributed with €88 million to BPI SGPS net profit while the 
group’s net profit was €66.8 million (meaning that without this contribution the group would 
have reported a loss in that year) (see Exhibit 22).. 
 
Mozambique 
In 1993, Banco de Fomento de Moçambique (BFM) started its business with a branch and an 
agency in Mozambique’s capital, Maputo, belonging to BFE. In 1996, BFE’s acquisition 
helped BPI reinforce its presence in the country developing commercial banking activities, 
something that had not been done before, since the bank’s presence in Mozambique was limited 
to consulting services related to investment banking. In 1998 the branch was transformed into 
a Mozambique-law bank, enabling the merger of BFM with Banco Comercial e de 
Investimentos (BCI) in 2003. Since then BPI owns 30% of BCI Fomento (BCIF), the newly-
created entity, along with Caixa Geral de Depósitosc that has a 51% equity stake. Its 
contribution to the overall profit of BPI SGPS ranged from €1,8 million in 2005 to €10,6 
million in 2014. In 2015, BCIF had a total of 163 branches in Mozambique and contributed to 
BPI SGPS profit with €9,4 million14,15 (see Exhibit 22).  
 
The eternal perfect bride 
 
Strategic visions and family businesses 
With the turn of the millennium, two of the major Portuguese Banks tried to merge: Banco 
Espirito Santo (BES) and BPI. BES’ CEO, Ricardo Salgado, and Artur Santos Silva saw a 
good opportunity to take advantage from two over dimensioned structures in order to build the 
biggest Portuguese Bank. However, in March of that year, a joint official release was issued 
stating the end of the merger talks. The official response stated that different strategic reasons 
were behind the deal’s collapse, pointing that the separate entities development would be 
                                                
c Caixa Geral de Depósitos is a Portuguese State owned bank  
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beneficial. The separation was allegedly initiated from the Espirito Santo side who feared that 
the family-owned group would loose control in the new entity18. From BPI’s side, Artur Santos 
Silva pointed to the lack of willingness and availability to build a joint project as the reason for 
the break up. Also, it was noted that BPI had serious corporate governance misgivings about 
BES- which later in 2014 turned out to be the reason for BES’ collapse19- pointed as the main 
reason for the merger failure. One of the final comments about the possible merger came from 
Fernando Ulrich, who ended saying: “I am not available for an Espírito Santo project”19  
 
Stockholm syndrome 
In March 2006, Banco Comercial Português (BCP) tried to acquire BPI. At that time, BCP 
offered €5,7 euros for each BPI share. However, even though BCP reviewed their offer- 
valuing BPI in €5,320 million with a premium of 12.35%- it was promptly declined since the 
target considered the offer as hostile. Artur Santos Silva, in a statement named “BPI vs. BCP- 
value creation versus value destruction”20, referred that the offer considerably undervalued BPI 
and did not favor shareholders’ interests nor clients or employees. Fernando Ulrich, in his own 
style, concluded by saying in a press conference that Paulo Teixeira Pinto (BCP’s CEO) was 
“very bold for a person that was in the banking management for less that one year”.  
However, like the hostage that ends up liking the kidnapper, on 25th October 2007, BPI 
proposed a merger with BCP, at a time when BCP was suffering an internal governance crisis. 
The offer was based on two major assumptions. First, given the first symptoms of an 
approaching financial crisis and the exposure of the Portuguese financial system to the real 
estate market, the merger could accelerate the growth rates of both businesses, expand into new 
markets and create cost synergies. Second, it was deemed that BPI’s good governance rules 
and strategic goals, if implemented on BCP, could bring more value to both shareholders and 
stakeholders. At that time, the exchange ratio would be 2 shares of BCP to 1 of BPI, increasing 
the new entity’s equity to a total sum of more than €2,5 billion. Once again, after discrepancies 
between both boards control demands, negotiations came to an end on the 25th November 
2007. BPI was trading at a price of €6,51 per share and BCP at €3,19 per share.22 (see Exhibit 
24). 
 




Sociedade Portuguesa de Investimentos was originally financed and supported by a group of 
100 investors, in its majority composed by some of the most important Portuguese business 
owners in the North of Portugal. This group included Americo Amorim- owner of Corticeira 
Amorim- with a long history in the Portuguese financial system and Salvador Caetano- owner 
Toyota’s distributor in Portugal. This group of original investors was dissolved when, in the 
late 1980s, Santander launched a successful hostile bid for Banco Comércio e Indústria, which 
at the time was the retail arm of BPI. The process split the group as there was an agreement 
made between Santander and some of the major shareholders, who decided to break up the 
alliance that they had previously made23.  
 
BPI’s wonder trio 
BPI’s reorganization process in 1995 led to the entrance of the Catalonian Bank La Caja de 
Ahorros y Pensiones de Barcelona (La Caixa) along with the German Insurer Allianz in the 
society’s equity. These shareholders joined the Brazilian bank Itaú to create a strategic alliance. 
In 1999, Allianz, La Caixa and Itaú had respectively 8.9%, 12.4% and 12.5% of the bank’s 
equity (see Exhibit 1).  
Allianz saw BPI as a strategic partner in order to sell its insurance products through the bank’s 
retail channels. This strategic partnership was extended when, in 2006, Euler Hermes (an 
insurance company owned by Allianz) and BPI bought COSEC- Companhia de Seguros de 
Créditos-, one of the biggest Portuguese credit insurance providers. BPI also has a participation 
of 35% in Allianz Portugal. La Caixa saw BPI as a well-established partner that covered the 
Portuguese market, eliminating the need for having a branch of the Spanish bank in the country. 
Itaú was in a similar situation as La Caixa, having a representation office in Lisbon that latter 
were turned into its European headquarters. 
Both acquisition attempts targeting BPI became proof tests for the resistance and support that 
the three key shareholders had, especially in the managing board. More specifically, when BPI 
was subject to he first hostile attempt from BCP, all trio members refused to accept the 
advantageous offer, stating its confidence in the management that had previously said that the 
bank would be much better on its own. Also, they signaled their trust by acquiring more BPI 
shares. 
Also, these key shareholders were very supportive of the major change in the Management 
Board of BPI’s history. Artur Santos Silva, because of the statutory limit that BPI has related 
to the CEO’s age limit, had to cease his executive functions. From that point onwards, he 
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remained the bank’s Chairman (a role that he had combined while being CEO). In his place 
Fernando Ulrich was appointed. Ulrich was one of the Vice-Presidents of SPI since 1983, 
having previously worked in the international department of Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor. He 
had also been the chief of staff of the Finance Minister and a financial journalist for Expresso. 
When BCP tried to acquire BPI, one of the conditions was to appoint a new CEO for the newly-
created entity, something that BPI’s shareholders did not agree with given the trust they 
deposited in Fernando Ulrich. 
 
The Angolan Princess 
Following the failure of the merger with BCP, the bank remained with 10% of BPI’s equity. 
Isabel dos Santos bought this position in 2008, through a holding company named Santoro 
Finance, becoming one of the key shareholders. 
Isabel dos Santos, daughter of the Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos (who came to 
presidency in 1979), made her first investment in Portugal in the energy sector, together with 
one of the first BPI’s shareholders, Américo Amorim. Today, her investments in Portugal 
amount to approximately €3 billion, being the most famous ones Galp Energiad, NOS SGPSe 
and BPI25.  
 
It only takes two to Tango 
In 2012, Itaú decided to leave Portugal and sell its BPI shares. Two years before, Itaú had 
decided to move its European headquarters from Lisbon to London, since the drop in Portugal’s 
rating in 2007 had limited the financing opportunities of financial intermediation through the 
issuance of international bonds from Portugal. Therefore, bonds had to be issued in Brazil in 
order to finance European operations, something that went against the European project’s 
interests. According to Carlos Câmara Pestana26, the Portuguese who presided Itaú, the 
partnership between the Portuguese and the Brazilian bank no longer made sense, given the 
headquarters switch and the intention to continue European operations.  
Even though there was a preference to sell the 19% position to Portuguese investors, La Caixa 
ended up acquiring it for €93 million (€0.5 per share). Afterwards, La Caixa sold part of this 
percentage to Santoro Finance, which ended up with 19.5% of BPI SGPS. The Spanish 
shareholder now owned 46.2% and Allianz remained with 8.8% of the entity’s capital. 
                                                
d Galp Energia is the biggest portuguese producer of petrol and natural gas. 
e NOS SGPS is one of the largest Portuguese telecommunications and TV providers. 
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Amongst Portuguese shareholders, Violas Financial group was the one with more BPI shares 
with 2.2% of the group’s equity (see Exhibit 1). 
 
Corporate Governance 
Since BPI’s inception, the group has been known for its set of good governance principles and 
practices. The main goal is to ensure that management acts in the best interests of all 
Shareholders and other Stakeholders. Some of the pillars include the adoption of best market 
practices regarding the communication of any group related information, the value creation as 
the management’s principal objective, the independence of executive management and the 
outmost commitment to the standards of ethical and professional conduct. In fact, BPI was one 
of the first Portuguese entities to release, together with its annual report, a Corporate 
Governance Report. This has occurred since 2000, a time when it was not yet mandatory for 
quoted companies to disclose such information. The main features of this report include the 
shareholder structure, governing bodies and committees, internal organization (as the reporting 
of irregularities and the internal control and risk management), remuneration of the company’s 
governing and management bodies as well as an analysis of compliance with the corporate 
governance code adopted. Regarding the number of independent non-executives,  
BPI Group’s governance model comprises the Latin model structure, one of the three 
comprised in the Commercial Companies Code. In particular, the Board of Directors is 
responsible for the firm’s management. This Board includes an Executive Committee 
composed by independent professionals from any shareholders’ or specific interests. The 
Consultative Bodies of the Board of Directors comprise 4 main constituents: 
- Financial Risks Committee: monitors the policy management of all financial risks, as 
the credit risks, the Bank’s activities and the management of pension funds; 
- Corporate Governance Committee: responsible for supporting and advising the Board 
of Directors as for the improvement of the governance and oversight model and 
addressing concerns related to social responsibility, ethics, professional conduct and 
environmental protection; 
- Nominations, Evaluation and Remuneration Committee- provide opinions related to 
nominations for the governing bodies, for the choice of Directors appointed to the 
Executive Committee and to exercise the functions envisaged by the rules of the Bank 
of Portugal related to remuneration policies. 
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These Consultative Bodies are solely composed by non-executives, something that does not 
happen in every other bank, in which these contain members of the Executive Committee. 
Composing these Bodies, one may find at least one independent member in each one (see 
Exhibit 25 to 26). 
Besides these Consultative Bodies, other oversight groups are part of the Group’s Governance 
model. The Supervisory Board is responsible for overseeing management’s compliance with 
the Law and the company’s Statutes, verifying the accounts, supervising the independence of 
the Portuguese Statutory Auditor and the external auditor and also evaluating the latter’s work. 
The General Meeting is attended by all Banco BPI shareholders, who deliberate on the issues 
such as the election of the governing bodies, the approval of director’s reports, the annual 
accounts, the distribution of profits and capital increases. The Remunerations Committee, 
appointed by the General Meeting, fixes the remuneration of the officers, based on the opinion 
of the Nominations, Evaluation and Remuneration Committee (see Exhibit 25). Lastly, the 
Company Secretary is appointed by the Board of Directors whose responsibilities are mainly 
related to performing the functions comprised in the Portuguese law and others attributed by 
the Bank14.   
 
Black gold turns into toxic lead 
 
Supervision wake up call  
On 4th November 2014, the supervision of the 120 largest European banks switched from 
national central banks, as the Bank of Portugal (BoP)27, to the ECB.  In December of 2014, the 
European Commission announced that the Republic of Angola had not been included in the 
list of 17 States or territories in which financial institution supervision could be recognized as 
equivalent as the one made by the European Union. While the BoP considered BPI’s exposure 
to BFA as sovereign debt with little or no risk, this was no longer accepted under ECB rules, 
which saw it as junk. In practical terms, this decision meant the end of zero or 20% risk 
weighting for Capital ratios and Risk Weighted asset computations, now considered at 100%. 
The first impact was the decrease of BPI’s Core Tier 1 capital ratio by one percentage point to 
8.6% (the required minimum by the ECB is 7%). The second effect was that this exposure 
would no longer be exempt from the large risks exposure limit included in European 
regulations. BPI was now exceeding this limit in approximately €3,000 million. The bank’s 
first reaction was to convey its conviction that the maximum loss arising from that exposure 
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would be €394 million- the book value of the 50.1% participation in BFA’s capital- which 
placed it under the limit of large risks. BPI submitted a proposal to ECB28 in order to apply the 
equity method for prudential purposes to BFA- allowing to reduce the maximum loss from the 
exposition to €394 million- something not accepted by the European entity. Therefore, one of 
the main priorities for 2015 was to find alternative solutions for the situation, since the EU had 
set a deadline for April of 2016. 
 
Voting rights limits 
Given the broad shareholder base that constituted SPI, one of the original bylaws was a voting 
rights limitation. This meant that even if a shareholder held more than a certain percentage of 
the firm’s equity, its voting power would never surpass that same percentage. As of 1999, this 
percentage was 12.5%, being increased to 17.5% in 2006 (when BCP tried to acquire BPI) and 
to 20% in 2010.  For example, even though La Caixa in 2015 held 44.1% and Santoro Finance 
held 18.6% of BPI’s equity, with a voting rights limit of 20% their decision power was about 
the same. The major aims of this bylaw were to maintain a broad number of key shareholders 
with enough strategic power, not allowing one or two that held substantially more equity to 
control all the major decisions according to their interests. 
 
Shareholder wars 
On the 17th of February of 2015, La Caixa launched a tender offer to the ownership of all BPI’s 
outstanding shares it did not own. At a price of €1.329 (closing price on the day before was 
€1.04), the tender offer had two main conditions: the elimination of any voting rights limits, 
which required 75% of the shareholder votes, and the acquisition of at least 5.9% of the overall 
shares outstanding (the minimum for La Caixa to have BPI’s control). 
Isabel dos Santos, responded to the tender offer by issuing a statement proposing a merger 
between BPI and BCP, in which she had interests a through Sonangolf. The statement was 
generally considered by the press as a disguised way of saying that she would be willing to sell 
her BPI shares, although at a significantly higher price31.  
On 5th March, BPI’s board of directors rejected La Caixa’s offer. The board believed that BPI’s 
shares were worth €2.26: €1.12 relative to the domestic activity, €0.92 for the international 
                                                
f Isabel dos Santos was nominated in 2016 for the presidency of the Executive Committee at 
Sonangol, an Angolan State company that explores petrol and natural gas in the country and 
that, on the 31st December 2014 held 19,44% of BCP. 
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activity and €0.22 to account for half of the synergies that La Caixa estimated for this 
acquisition.  
Three months later, in a shareholders’ meeting, Santoro Finance submitted a motion to 
eliminate the limits on voting rights30. Voting against its own proposal, Santoro made use of 
the voting rights limit to derail one of the takeover’s condition. La Caixa, on the following day, 
announced that the takeover plans had failed, precisely because one of the conditions that 
would make it successful would not be met. In the following shareholders’ meeting, on 
February of 2016, Santoro Finance making use of the “armour-plating effect” rejected once 
again a proposal made by the board of directors of BPI’s to eliminate the statutory limit on 
votes. Even though the voting attained 63.08% of favorable votes, Santoro’s decision to vote 
against was crucial in order for it not to attain the 66.6% minimum limit in order for the decision 
to be approved. 
 
Back to Angola 
Previously, on 30th September 2015, BPI’s board of directors approved a spin-off of BPI, in a 
way that would separate the bank from BFA and avoid the large risks limit imposed by the 
ECB. The solution would be to create another separate holdings company that would comprise 
BPI’s participation in BFA, in which BPI’s shareholders would own the same percentage as 
they had in the bank. However, not all shareholders (as La Caixa) agreed with this solution, as 
they did not want to be directly exposed to Angola. On the other hand, at the start of 201631, 
Unitel, the other major BFA shareholder, proposed an acquisition of 10% of BFA’s shares for 
€140 million, an offer that was promptly rejected by the board of BPI. Several reasons 
supported the rejection. Firstly, BPI did not want to loose that much equity for that price in a 
firm that had contributed a lot for the enhancement of its profits. Secondly, Fernando Ulrich 
said that the spin-off was much more advantageous for BPI’s interests than selling part of BFA. 
On top of this, Portugal Telecom Ventures, a firm belonging to one of the largest Portuguese 
Telecommunications provider that had already suffered governance problems in the BES case, 
was also a shareholder of Unitel (with 25%). As it had not been notified of Unitel’s proposal 
to acquire part of BFA and was against it, it had submitted a complaint that was approved by 
the Court of Trade of Paris, creating a problem that Ulrich wanted to avoid32.   
 
Can’t keep my hands to myself 
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As if the Portuguese Government did not have enough problems to deal with, it also determined 
that the case with BPI was a matter of National interest. Thus, in April of 2016 the Government 
created a diploma aiming to solve the situation of the voting rights limit. It created a law only 
applicable to financial institutions with this bylaw, in which the maintenance or elimination of 
voting rights limits had to be voted in a shareholders’ assembly every five years. Also, it stated 
that institutions that had such voting rights limits in 2016 were obliged to gather its 
shareholders and include such voting in a shareholders’ meeting until the end of the year, 
otherwise, voting rights limits on these institutions would be automatically eliminated. Also, if 
this type of voting occurred, no voting rights limits would be exercised, meaning that, in the 
case of BPI, La Caixa would vote with 44.1% and would not limited to 20%.  
Even though the Government justified this decision by saying that it was beneficial to attract 
foreign investment for the country, Isabel dos Santos stated that an historical and unparalleled 
decision had been taken which was obviously very beneficial for one part (La Caixa) of the 
conflict. With less weighting in terms of decision power, shares would obviously be worth less, 
beneficiating La Caixa which had presented in the year before a tender offer with a generally 
considered low offer price. The Government, in the words of Prime-Minister António Costa, 
responded by saying that the diploma on the first instance was approved because there was an 
agreement between La Caixa and Santoro, however ending up by having to be approved since 
the agreement was no longer on the table. This potential agreement that António Costa was 
referring to started to be talked after Portuguese newspapers disclosed that negotiations 
between La Caixa and Santoro had resumed, intermediated by the Portuguese Government, in 
which a potential solution would comprise the selling of Angolan’s shares to the Spanish group 
and, in exchange, Unitel would acquire and keep the totality of BFA’s shares33.  
 
The never ending tour 
In the end, after several negotiations and suspended shareholders’ assemblies- at a time when 
credit line of $440 million granted by La Caixa to Angolan’s Government was being 
investigated by Comissão de Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM)g-33, on September of 
2016 in a shareholders meeting, a proposal presented by Violas Ferreira Financial to eliminate 
voting rights limits was approved34. However, this approval was not made to the initial proposal 
                                                
g CMVM is the Portuguese Securities Market Commission. Constituted in 1991, it supervises 
and regulates securities and stock markets as well as the activities of those who operate in 
them. 
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presented by the board of BPI- the one under the diploma of the Government- since Violas 
Ferreira Financial had presented an injunction to the Government’s decision, considering it to 
be illegitimate. This meant that Isabel dos Santos had conceded to abstain Santoro’s vote 
because the voting rights limits were still in place. On the day before, the board of BPI had 
informed CMVM saying that it had sent a letter to Unitel proposing a sale of 2% of BFA for 
€28 million. The offer was contingent on the approval of the remaining shareholders as well as 
on the vote of Santoro to end the voting rights limits, something that eventually happened35. 
The ending of the voting rights limits was, under CMVM’s opinion, a clear sign that now La 
Caixa had control over BPI. Now the Spanish group was obliged to proceed to an acquisition 
of the totality of the Portuguese group’s capital since there is a Portuguese law that states that 
a shareholder holding of more than one third of another firm must launch a tender offer for the 
total capital36. La Caixa had previously obtained a waiver from CMVM given the voting rights 
limits. Previously, on April 2016, La Caixa had already stated an intention to acquire BPI 
shares at €1.113 per share, for a total valuation of €1,622 million. Also, it had requested ECB 
to suspend any sanctions (because the deadline had already passed), since it was actively 
working on a solution for the excessive risk concentration issue. Finally, on 13th October, the 
Board of Directors approved a tender offer by La Caixa at €1.34 per share. Even though Ulrich 
believed that BPI was worth €1.38 p/share, he considered the offer to be “friendly and at a good 
timing, since BPI could now take new challenges and opportunities in the banking sector”. As 
a result, Edgar Alves Ferreira, the representative on the board of Violas Ferreira Financial, 
quitted since the shareholder was always against the offer. 
Once again, a shareholders’ meeting was called for 23rd November 2016, to approve the sale 
of 2% of BFA to Unitel- a proposal presented by BPI’s board of directors. However, a proposal 
to suspend the meeting by La Caixa was approved. The argument for the suspension was based 
on the lack of formal approval by the ECB of this sale as to whether or not it would limit the 
exposure within European regulation. The largest Portuguese shareholder, Violas Ferreira 
Financial, raised a concern that the suspension was not due to the lack of ECB’s approval but 
because La Caixa wanted to wait for the approval of the payment of BFA’s dividends to BPI. 
Finally, on the 13th December 2016, the sale of 2% of BFA to Unitel was approved by 
shareholders in a meeting37. The ECB also issued a statement saying that there was no 
opposition to the transaction and that now BPI is under the large risks limit. Also, the National 
Bank of Angola approved the transaction.  
 
Santos Silva’s dilemmas 
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As Chairman of the Board of Directors, Santos Silva has a fiduciary duty with all shareholders. 
This means that his actions must attempt to favor everyone’s interests. On practice, should BPI 
accept an offer below the fair price for BFA? If on one hand it helps to eliminate the problem, 
because the Angolan has on her hands the solution for the problem, on the other, doing it would 
favor one shareholder jeopardizing the others- not only La Caixa but all other smaller 
shareholders. Also, given that the transaction is made between related parties (Isabel dos Santos 
has interests in BPI and BFA), Santos Silva must set up an independent committee to oversee 
it. Moreover, there are always smaller shareholders that do not fully agree with the solution, 
given that they also want higher returns. This would create a major Corporate Governance 
issue, something that BPI always prided itself for avoiding when compared to its Portuguese 
peers. However, the imposition of heavy fines by the ECB, which would certainly harm every 
shareholder, urges for a solution. Therefore, there is a trade-off between following sound 
governance principles- and they can still be followed by setting up an independent committee 
to oversee the transaction- and the opportunity gain of not following them. Particularly, the life 
of the bank can be completely blocked, and now, when taking into account that Isabel dos 
Santos owns the majority of BFA’s capital, BPI’s position is more fragile, given that 
transparence of businesses made in Angola is not as ideal as it should be.  
Concluding, the cost of giving up more money to Isabel dos Santos in exchange for not having 
to pay €3.5 million in daily fines seems an easy decision to take. However, given the bad 
reputation that it might bring because of the breached governance rules, Santos Silva must take 
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Overview 
This case study aims to describe the impacts created on Banco Português de Investimento’s 
governance when supervision of the largest 120 European banks switched from National Banks 
to the European Central Bank. Given that the Republic of Angola had not been included in the 
list of 17 States or territories in which financial institution supervision could be recognised as 
equivalent as the one made by the European Union, BPI was informed that its exposure to 
Angola, through one of its subsidiaries- Banco de Fomento Angolano-, surpassed the limit of 
the large risks imposed by the ECB in €3 billion. This subsidiary had been very important for 
BPI since it had enhanced over the past years its weak earnings due tot he struggling domestic 
market. The immediate response of BPI was to explain to the ECB that this exposure would 
have at maximum a loss of €394 million (the book value of BFA), something that was not 
accepted by the European authority. If a solution would not be found by April 2016, the bank 
would face €3.5 million in daily fines. 
On top of this, BPI’s shareholders were fighting for the institution’s control. La Caixa, two 
months after the ECB decision decided to launch a tender offer to acquire all outstanding shares 
it did not own with two major conditions: 
 - a minimum of 5,9% of the outstanding shares would have to be bought;  
 - the existing voting rights limit of 20% would have to be eliminated. 
While the first condition relied mainly on price agreements, the second was much more 
difficult to attain. One of the bank’s bylaws stated that a single shareholder would have its 
decision power caped at a 20% voting rights limit, independently from the shares it could held. 
In practice, this meant that Santoro Finance, that held 18,8% of BPI, had about the same control 
as La Caixa with 44% of the outstanding shares. On top of this, Santoro Finance was controlled 
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by Isabel dos Santos, daughter of the President of Angola, that also controlled Unitel- the other 
major shareholder of BFA with 49,9%. Therefore, she had interests on both sides of the 
problem, and, she would only be willing to accept a solution that would be very favourable for 
her pockets. This meant that she would only be willing to give up on her pivotal position on 
BPI in exchange for very favourable terms in BFA- as paying less to own a majority in BFA’s 
capital in exchange for voting to eliminate the voting rights limits and concede the controlling 
power in BPI to La Caixa.  
In Corporate Governance terms, this case illustrates two major problems. Even though BPI was 
known for its set of good governance practices, the voting rights limits along with this 
transaction between related parties constitute breaches that ought to be analysed in detail.  First, 
when a voting rights limit is imposed, the principle of “one share, one vote” is being violated. 
Secondly, if Isabel dos Santos is obtaining a higher return that other shareholders of BPI, 
whether by paying less for BFA or by obtaining more money for her shares when La Caixa 
completes its tender offer, it also violates good governance principles (one should also not 
forget that La Caixa granted a $440 million credit line to the Republic of Angola in the wake 
of the negotiations).  
Both sides of the problem need to be evaluated. The opportunity cost of not solving the problem 
is big; fines imposed by the ECB are huge and, if in place, will harm every shareholder. On the 
other hand, solving the problem may lead to breaking good governance principles, something 
that may harm the institution in the present and in future businesses, with potential fines from 
regulators. Therefore, and as a €12 billion capital raise is not a viable solution for the problem, 
the major question one should ask is: is it more advantageous to follow good governance rules 
and have a €3,5 million daily problem or find an alternative way and solve the problem by 
reducing the exposure to Angola? 
Finally, La Caixa, after one failed tender offer that was rejected by BPI’s BoD, launched a 
second one at a higher price (€1.34 p/ share). This offer followed the elimination of the voting 
rights limits in shareholders meeting- in which Santoro Finance abstained to vote- and 
anticipated the approved sale, also in a shareholders meeting, of 2% of BFA to Unitel by €28 
million.  
 
Conceptual Foundation and Teaching Objectives 
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This case study allows students to analyse how an institution that follows good Corporate 
Governance principles may see itself in a dead end, where sometimes breaching them is the 
only viable solution. Also, it prompts a discussion around the following teaching objectives: 
1. To critically evaluate European banking supervision and understand the impact of 
regulatory frameworks. 
2. To understand how financial institutions use accounting methods for their advantage 
when dealing with subsidiaries in foreign countries. 
3. To evaluate the costs and benefits that may arise from Corporate Governance 
mechanisms. 
4. To discuss how different shareholders’ interests lead to the actions they may take 
according to their goals.   
 
Suggested Student Assignments 
1. How does BPI’s Governance Model fit into the Bank for International 
Settlements’ Corporate Governance recommendations and how does it compare 
to its peers? 
The Bank for International Settlements’ recommendations outline a set of principles that banks 
should follow regarding sound Corporate Governance matters. When comparing BPI’s 
Governance model with these recommendations, one does not find major significant 
differences. For example, when it comes to the Board of Directors’ qualifications, we see that 
the majority has previous experience in banking, ensuring the skills required to perform such 
positions. Also, the Executive Committee is solely composed by independent members. On the 
other hand, we see that a lot of the members of the Board of Directors connections to key 
shareholders of the bank, and, when evaluating their independence, we see that there is not a 
really good balance between those who are and those who are not. Regarding their 
compensation, we see that there is a committee responsible for it and that, the structure (with 
variable pay and a programme of long-term incentives) is aligned with BIS’ recommendations, 
specially when it comes to managing their risk appetite. However, BIS recommends that banks 
should have a Committee dedicated to Ethics and Compliance, ensuring that the decision-
making process is supported by appropriate means, where risks for the bank’s reputation are 
considered and that compliance with internal rules, laws and regulations is ensured. One can 
see that this functions may be spread over other committees- as the Financial Risks or 
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Corporate Governance ones- however it is a point in which BPI does not specifically follows 
BIS recommendations.  
BPI’s governance, when compared to its peers, may have contributed to a different 
management- specially when taking into account recent scandals as BES or BCP in the past. 
The separation in 2004 between the Chairman and the CEO position is an example. Another 
example is the direct reporting of the Audit and Internal Committee to the Board of Directors 
and not to the Executive Committee, something that happens in BCP or happened in BES. 
 
2. How do you see the voting rights limits regarding good governance practices? 
Despite BPI’s governance model appearing to be appropriate for this kind of institution, it 
violates one major principle of a good governance practice: the equivalence of one share to one 
voting right.  
By imposing a cap on voting decisions, BPI does not allow one single shareholder to control 
the bank. We believe that this statutory condition is very related to the original shareholder 
base, which, because of its broad diversification, tried to give all shareholders (independent 
from its size) a say when deciding on major issues related to the firm’s life. Moreover, it 
allowed the bank to remain immune to takeover attempts, as the one La Caixa tried to make. It 
also enabled that reference shareholders had an important say, however preventing them to 
control the firm and leaving some of their interests apart from BPI.  
The issue with the model is that it works perfectly well when reference shareholders (as La 
Caixa and Santoro) have their interests synchronized. The best example for this were the 
peaceful times lived when the shareholder’s trio (La Caixa, Allianz and Itau) held the majority 
of BPI’s outstanding shares, allowing them to have strategic partnerships and protect their own 
interests without controlling the bank. On the other hand, when there is a significant change in 
reference shareholders’ composition (as when Itau left the society’s capital), their interests may 
no longer be aligned. As Santoro’s major interest was to merge BPI with BCP while La Caixa 
wanted to gain the firm’s control, the initial model that aimed to foster peace no longer worked, 
creating a big lock in the firm’s life.  
 
3. Why is  BFA a problem to the ECB and not for the BoP? 
One of the main risks related to the exposition of BPI to BFA is related to Angola’s currency. 
The lack of liquidity of dollars or euros in Angola is known, meaning that the real exchange 
ratio from kwanzas is very different than the official one. Still, accounting rules determine that 
the exchange ratio for consolidation purposes (as the one made by BPI to BFA accounts) should 
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be made at the official rate. Therefore, the real exposition that BPI has through BFA to assets 
as Angola Sovereign bonds is greater than the one accounted given the lack of liquidity to 
exchange kwanzas (the currency in which Angolan Sovereign debt tend to be issued). 
Other key risks of Angola to BPI are related to the actual characteristics of the country. Being 
the country’s GDP highly related to the price of oil, and given its volatility, the country tends 
to be severely affected when it is low, ultimately reflecting in its credit risk and affecting the 
holders of sovereign debt.  
Still, when supervision switched from the BoP to the ECB, how may Angola started to be a 
problem for BPI? The answer may be related to a certain degree of bias that local regulators 
may have. In this case, the Portuguese connections to Angola are very long-dated, meaning 
that supervision criteria, namely when risk-weighting assets, tend to be more relaxed for local 
regulators than for central ones, as the ECB.  
Another issue that is important to refer is related to the actual supervision rules. In this case, 
by loosing the controlling power of BFA (and earning an amount approximate to €130 million), 
BPI no longer has to consolidate all the accounts of BFA in its own and may start using a 
patrimonial equivalence accounting method. This also means that in exchange for €130 million, 
a €3 billion problem disappears. In other words, by reducing the risk in 5% (the BFA shares 
sold by BPI to Unitel), a capital buffer of €3 billion no longer needs to be raised, which 
somehow seems disproportionate. This demonstrates that regulatory models take preference in 
the “shape” over the “substance” of the assets being discussed in this case, meaning that these 
models are much based in accounting rules and not in the actual risks. 
 
4. Why does La Caixa launched the first tender offer knowing that the probability 
of success was reduced? 
La Caixa launched a tender offer on the 17th of February of 2015 aiming to own all BPI shares 
that it did not own yet. With a price of €1.329 (27,8% above its closing price of that day), the 
offer had a low success probability, given the conditions presented by the Spanish group in 
order for it to be successful. These included: 
- The acquisition of at least 5,9% of the overall shares outstanding; 
- The elimination of any shareholder voting rights limits. 
The set of conditions presented had a clear purpose: assume the control of the bank. Since La 
Caixa already owned about 44% of BPI, it was time that it could control the Portuguese entity. 
While the first condition did not seem to complicate to achieve, being only dependent on the 
right price, when combined with the second the story was very different. Still, the main goal 
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of the tender offer was to show that from that point onwards BPI’s major shareholder wanted 
a different path for the institution than the one it had follow until that moment. 
Isabel dos Santos, facing this decision from La Caixa, first announced that she would propose 
a new merger between BPI and BCP, combining her interests in both firms. Given the low 
probability of such event occurring (taking into account the past of both institutions), this was 
considered by the public as a disguised way to say that she would be willing to sell but a 
significant higher price. The Angolan knew that, at that moment, she had a central role in 
resolving the problem. The reason was that the blocking mechanisms triggered by BPI’s 
statutes gave her a pivotal role, even though she only owned less than 20% of the firm’s equity. 
This condition, along with a controlling power in Unitel, gave her 100% of the solution, 
something she wanted to leverage in order to obtain a higher return than other shareholders in 
the reorganization process. Therefore, unless another solution was found (as raising €3 billion 
in capital that was deemed as impossible given the market conditions), she had the “cheese and 
the knife” on her hands, meaning that BPI’s controlling power had a price- a trade-off between 
a €3 billion and a smaller amount that she could receive. This meant that, if returns were not 
unevenly distributed in her favour, Santoro could block the entire firm and create an even 
bigger problem.   
 
5. In your opinion, was BPI’s board right when it issued a statement containing an 
unfavourable opinion and inviting remaining shareholders to decline the tender 
offer? What difficulties do you believe it may have felt? 
BPI’s board, given its structure, had high influence from La Caixa due to the equity stake that 
the Spanish institution had in the Portuguese bank. For obvious reasons, representatives from 
La Caixa could not vote, however it could be anticipated that BPI’s board could take the 
Spanish side of the problem, specially when taking into account that some administrators were 
appointed due to the confidence that La Caixa deposited on them (starting by the bank’s CEO 
Fernando Ulrich). Also, La Caixa had always deposited its trust in the board.  
By having the courage to issue a negative opinion about the tender offer, BPI’s management 
board revealed above all independence from its reference shareholder, immunity to its 
pressures and care for smaller shareholders.  
 
6. What kind of solutions do you envisage for the problem? 
In order for Santoro to accept any solution, and because of Isabel dos Santos’ pivotal role in 
the problem, there could be an asymmetric division of the returns of the tender offer.  
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The first solution would be to raise the €3 billion in capital. The problems related to this 
solution are mainly two. Firstly, and regarding the market conditions at that time, for a financial 
institution to raise that amount in capital in low interest rates times and with the condition of 
the Portuguese financial system, current shareholders that would not want to exercise their 
rights would see their equity stakes very reduced (given the needed devaluation in order to 
make the new shares attractive). Secondly, in operational terms, having to raise such amount 
of capital does not seem very attractive. This has to do with the fact that, on paper, Angola’s 
operation seems very attractive. However, in a risk-adjusted basis, as for instance when taking 
into account currency risk, its attractiveness is reduced. When considering the trade-off 
between the devaluation of current shareholders shares and the profits arising from Angolan 
operations, in reality the capital raise does not seem very possible.  
The second solution could comprise a review of the tender offer’s price. By making it higher, 
La Caixa could make Santoro accept its conditions and concede the controlling power to the 
Spanish institution. While Santoro can accept it, La Caixa would have to spend much more 
money by paying all remaining shareholders the same amount.  
Finally, another solution could be the previously referred asymmetric division of the price paid 
in the tender offer. This solution has the major inconvenient of jeopardising good governance 
rules, something that BPI always prided itself for. However, the main questions one should ask 
are: What is the monetary difference that the solution represent in the life of BPI? The answer 
is clear; €3 billion- the amount that BPI needs to raise in order to avoid sanctions of ECB due 
to its exposition to Angola. This solution would also have to entail a designated special 
independent committee to oversee the transaction, since they are transactions with related 
parties- not only the transaction between shareholders but also the payment that Unitel would 
have to make to BPI in order to assume the control of BFA. Thus, the committee would have 
to take into account the opportunity cost between good governance measures and the impact 
of a no solution in the life of BPI. Moreover, the committee would have to ensure that the BFA 
transaction is made at a fair value but that the situation is solved because of the costs involved. 
For instance, a member from Violas Financial was already complaining after the last 
shareholders meeting about this issue. Also, another issue relative to the case that should be 
comprised in the committee’s set of actions would be the investigation of a €400 million loan 
conceded by La Caixa to the Republic of Angola- the details are not very known but should be 
subject to investigation beyond the one made by CMVM. 
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